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John Randolph Tucker, for whom this lecture series is named, when
asked how he could serve as counsel for the Haymarket Anarchists in Spies
v. Illinois,' reportedly answered: "I do not defend anarchy. I defend the
Constitution. 2
Such a voice is needed in this country's crime debate today to remind
Americans that those who argue for fairness in our criminal justice system
do not defend crime, they defend the Constitution. Such a voice is needed
because, increasingly, due process and other guarantees of the Bill of
Rights are regarded as little more than inconvenient impediments to ridding
our society of murderers, rapists, robbers, and other criminals.
That voice has been missing in the exceptionally one-sided debate on
crime that has dominated politics in the United States for the last thirty
years. Americans have been told that the answer to the crime problem is
longer prison terms, harsher conditions of imprisonment, greater use of the
death penalty, less due process, and less judicial review.3 There has been
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1. 123 U.S. 131 (1887).
2. John W. Davis, John Randolph Tucker: The Man and His Work, 6 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 139, 142 (1949).
3. See, e.g., David Johnston & Tim Weiner, Seizing the Crime Issue, Clinton Blurs
Party Lines, N.Y. TuMEs, Aug. 1, 1996, at Al (describing President Clinton's successful
effort to take "crime issue" away from Republicans by embracing punitive measures such
as expanding federal death penalty, limiting death row appeals, and constructing more
prisons).
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (1997)
virtually no debate among politicians about the wisdom of these measures -
whether they constitute an effective crime control policy or whether they
will actually make Americans safer in their homes and on the streets.4
Instead, politicians have engaged one another over the question of who
is the "toughest." Those who promised "three strikes and you're out" -
life imprisonment for persons convicted of three felonies' - were quickly
topped by those promising "two strikes and you're out."' The Clinton
administration has even issued a "one strike, you're out" rule for people
who commit certain crimes while living in public housing.7
Those who promised to imprison more were topped by those who
promised to make conditions within prisons even harsher by removing exer-
cise equipment, eliminating educational and vocational programs, and even
restoring chain gangs.' Those who promised the death penalty for some
crimes were topped by those who supported the death penalty for even more
crimes.
4. Although politicians in both major parties have been unwilling to question these
policies for fear of appearing "soft on crime," academics and other commentators have
questioned them. See generally, e.g., CAMPAIGN FOR AN EFFECTIVE CRIME POLICY, THE
IMPACT OF "THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT" LAWS: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? (Sept.
1996) (analyzing effect and impact of "three strikes" laws); David J. Rothman, The Crime
of Punishment, N.Y. REV. BOOKs, Feb. 17, 1994, at 34 (reviewing several books and
studies of crime and corrections policies).
5. See CAMPAIGN'FOR AN EFFECTIVE CRIME POLICY, supra note 4, at 1, 11-12
(describing "three strikes" laws of federal government and 22 states); Fox Butterfield, New
Prisons Cast Shadow over Higher Education, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 12, 1995, at A21 (describ-
ing impact of "three strikes and you're out" law in California). For the first time, Califor-
nia is spending more on its prisons than on its two university systems. Id.
6. Georgia Governor Zell Miller proposed "two strikes and you're out" in his 1994
campaign for re-election. Leslie Phillips, Crime Pays, USA TODAY, Oct. 10, 1994, at llA.
The Georgia legislature enacted such a provision. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-7 (Supp. 1996);
see also Editorial, Georgia's 'Two Strikes' Tough Enough, ATLANTA J. & CoNsT., Mar. 6,
1995, at A8 (suggesting law is tough enough and should not be expanded); Rhonda Cook,
Lock 'Em Up, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 26, 1995, at R1 (describing "two strikes" law
and other measures resulting in greater rates of imprisonment in Georgia).
7. Johnston & Weiner, supra note 3.
8. See Rick Bragg, Chain Gangs to Return to Roads of Alabama, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
26, 1995, § 1, at 1 (describing return of chain gangs to Alabama); Adam Nossiter, Making
Hard 2me Harder, States Cut Jail TV and Sports, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1994, at Al
(describing efforts to take away television and exercise equipment for prisoners in many
states); Neal R. Peirce, America's Angry Penal Policy, BALT. SUN, July 29, 1996, at 9A
(describing America's penal policy of 1990s as one of "meanness and retribution"); Charles
Walston, Prison Chief Wants Inmates Walking, Working Daily: 4-Mile Treks Now Part of
Jail "Experience," ATLANTA J. & CONsT., Jan. 3, 1996, at Al (reporting that new head of
Georgia's Department of Corrections, declaring that 30-35% of Georgia's prisoners "ain't
fit to kill," would require inmates to make four-mile walks and to dig ditches).
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And politicians have delivered on their promises. The United States
incarcerates a greater percentage of its population than any other country in
the world.9 Thirty-eight states provide for the death penalty," and over fifty
federal crimes are punishable by death.' More people were executed in the
United States last year than in any year since the reinstatement of capital
punishment in 1976.12 The United States leads the world in the execution
of children and is one of only five countries in the world that has executed
children in the last six years.' 3 The others are Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
and Yemen. 14
Politicians have also told Americans that less process and less judicial
review is the answer to the crime problem. In particular, they have attacked
federal habeas corpus review of state court convictions. Habeas corpus is
the mechanism by which a person convicted in a state or federal court may
petition the federal courts for review of a conviction or sentence on the
grounds that it was obtained in violation of the Constitution." As the
Supreme Court once observed:
Over the centuries [the writ of habeas corpus] has been the common law
world's "freedom writ" by whose orderly processes the production of a
prisoner in court may be required and the legality of the grounds for his
incarceration inquired into, failing which the prisoner is set free. We
repeat what has been so truly said of the federal writ: "there is no higher
duty than to maintain it unimpaired," and unsuspended, save only in the
cases specified in our Constitution.' 6
9. U.S. Incarceration Rate Has Slowed, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1997, at A16
(reporting Department of Justice announcement that there are 1.6 million inmates in prison
and jails, giving United States incarceration rate of 615 per 100,000, higher even than
Russia's).
10. NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, DEATH Row, U.S.A. 1 (Summer 1996)
[hereinafter DEATH Row, U.S.A.].
11. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, §§ 60001-60026, 108 Stat. 1796, 1959-82 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 18 U.S.C.) (providing death penalty for over fifty crimes); Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7001, 102 Stat. 4181, 4387 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 848(e) (1994)) (authorizing death penalty for drug "king-pins").
12. DEATH Row, U.S.A., supra note 10, at 2 (reporting fifty-six executions in 1995).
13. AMNEsTY INT'L, FACTS AND FIGURES ON THE DEATH PENALTY 2 (Oct. 1996).
14. Id.
15. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (1994); see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 394-426 (1963)
(describing history and role of Great Writ).
16. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712-13 (1961) (quoting Bowen v. Johnson, 306
U.S. 19, 26 (1939)).
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However, politicians have recently attacked habeas corpus as delaying
executions, disrupting the administration of criminal justice by the states,
causing friction between federal and state courts, and frustrating the fight
against crime. In an effort to increase the number and speed of executions,
Congress eliminated funding for death penalty resource centers, which pro-
vided lawyers to the condemned in habeas corpus proceedings, "7 and passed
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,18 which places
new, unprecedented restrictions on habeas corpus review. 9
For the first time in the nation's history, Congress has imposed a
statute of limitations on petitions for habeas corpus relief.' The Act also
prohibits federal courts from granting habeas corpus relief unless the
decision of the state court "involved an unreasonable application of clearly
established Federal law,"2 severely limits when a federal court may con-
duct an evidentiary hearing,' and prohibits second or "successive" petitions
for habeas corpus relief except in very narrow circumstances.'
The purpose, scope, and wisdom of federal habeas corpus review has
long been debated.' Traditionally, habeas corpus review has existed to
correct violations of constitutional rights, not to relitigate issues of guilt or
innocence. However, in proposing restrictions on habeas corpus review in
1970, Judge Henry J. Friendly of the United States Court of Appeals for
17. Marcia Coyle, Republicans Take Aim at Death Row Lawyers, NAT'L L.J., Sept.
18, 1995, at Al.
18. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (amending 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2241-2255 and
adding 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2261-2266) (West 1994 & Supp. 1996).
19. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 107, 110 Stat. 1214, 1221-26 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2261-2266).
20. Id. §§ 101, 105 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2244, 2255) (amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(1) to establish one-year statute of limitations). A statute of limitations of 180 days
is provided by Section 107 of the Act, codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2263, for states that meet
certain standards of providing counsel in capital post-conviction proceedings.
21. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 104(3)(3) (codified at 28
U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1)).
22. Id. § 104(3)(4) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(2)).
23. Id. §§ 105, 106 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2255, 2244) (limiting any successive
habeas corpus petition to constitutional violations that result in conviction of innocent person
or involve new rule of law that applies retroactively to cases on collateral review).
24. See generally Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REv. 441 (1963); James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next
Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L.
Ray. 1997 (1992); Ira P. Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in
State Death Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 1 (1990); Larry W. Yackle, Explaining
Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 991 (1985); Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope,
66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331 (1993).
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the Second Circuit raised the question of whether innocence was a proper
consideration in the collateral review of criminal judgments.' He answered
the question in the affirmative, proposing that, with certain exceptions,
habeas corpus relief should be granted only when the prisoner could estab-
lish a constitutional violation and make a colorable claim of innocence.
Today, in light of the drastic restrictions on habeas corpus review that
have recently become law, it is appropriate to ask a different question:
whether fairness is irrelevant to the processes by which the loss of life and
liberty is determined.
Although many argue that constitutional protections only get in the way
of convicting the guilty, most would agree - at least, in the abstract -
with the importance ofprocess: a proceeding conducted in accordance with
established rules, presided over by an impartial judge, in which the accused
is capably represented by a competent lawyer, and in which the outcome is
not influenced by improper factors such as race, politics, or economic
status. The legal system supposedly strives to provide this sort of process.
But in practice, we encounter questions about how best to ensure fair-
ness and whether fairness is worth the cost involved. Under our concept
of federalism, what are the relative roles of the state and federal courts in
ensuring fairness? Are state court judges - most of whom must stand for
periodic election or retention - sufficiently insulated from political pres-
sures so that they can enforce the protections of the Constitution? When
we discover after a trial that the process was deficient, does our commit-
ment to fairness include a willingness to allocate the resources needed to
conduct a second trial? Is there a point at which finality - bringing pro-
ceedings to an end - is more important than fairness?
In exploring these questions, I would like to review the role that
habeas corpus has played in ensuring justice in our history, examine two
fundamental components of fairness in the state systems - the impartiality
of judges and the provision of counsel for those too poor to retain a law-
yer - and then describe why fairness matters and what we can do to bring
about a greater commitment to fairness in our system of justice.
The Once-Great Writ of Habeas Corpus
There is no better example of the importance and value of the writ of
habeas corpus than the case of Rubin "Hurricane" Carter, who was freed
by a federal judge after being wrongfully imprisoned by New Jersey for
almost twenty years.
25. See Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal
Judgments, 38 U. CmH. L. REV. 142 (1970).
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Carter, an African-American, was the number-one-ranked contender
for the middleweight boxing crown in 1966 when he and a companion were
arrested and charged with the murders of three white people.' They were
convicted and narrowly escaped the death penalty? While in prison,
Carter wrote the story of his life.' In 1980, Lesra Martin, a 16-year-old
African-American youth from Brooklyn, who had been taken in by a group
of Canadians, bought a copy of Carter's book for one dollar at a used-book
fair in Toronto.29 He and his Canadian friends read the book and became
convinced of Carter's innocence. Working with attorneys Myron Beldock
and Leon Friedman, the Canadians spent four and one-half years investigat-
ing the case and providing Carter with moral support.30
After Carter had been rejected many times in New Jersey courts,
United States District Court Judge H. Lee Sarokin granted habeas corpus
relief in 1985 after concluding that the prosecution had withheld critical
exculpatory evidence and improperly argued racial hatred as the motive for
the crime.31 Carter was released and has lived in Canada ever since.
Today, Rubin Carter is one of the most eloquent spokesmen in support
of the writ of habeas corpus. He has testified before Congress and spoken
at law schools .3  He is the director of an international organization, the
Association in Defense of the Wrongly Convicted, and seeks the release of
other people who were wrongfully convicted and imprisoned. He is a
living example of the value of the Great Writ.
But federal habeas corpus relief has corrected other injustices besides
the conviction of innocent people. For example, the United States Supreme
Court unanimously ordered habeas corpus relief for Tony Amadeo after it
was revealed at a federal evidentiary hearing that the prosecutor had se-
cretly directed jury commissioners to under-represent African-Americans
in the jury pools.3 3 Amadeo had been sentenced to death by a jury drawn
26. State v. Carter, 255 A.2d 746, 748-49 (N.J. 1969).
27. See Id. at 755.
28. RUBIN "HuRRIcANE" CARTER, THE 16TH ROUND: FROM NUMBER I CONTENDER
TO #45472 (1974).
29. See William Nack, True to His Words, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 13, 1992, at
81, 82-83.
30. See id. at 84-88, 90, 92, 95; see also SAM CHAITON & TERRY SWINTON, LAZARUs
AND THE HURRICANE (1991) (describing freeing of Rubin Carter).
31. Carter v. Rafferty, 621 F. Supp. 533, 558 (D.N.J. 1985), aff'd inpart, appeal
dismissed in part, 826 F.2d 1299 (3d Cir. 1987).
32. See, e.g., Rubin "Hurricane" Carter, Death Penalty Symposium Keynote Address,
35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 425 (1995); Ira Berkow, Justice Delayed Is Bitter Justice for
Carter, N.Y. TIm, Jan. 24, 1993, § 8, at 2.
33. Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 219-21 (1988).
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from the rigged pools in a Georgia state court34
Jimmy Horton was granted habeas corpus relief based on evidence
presented at a federal evidentiary hearing that the prosecutor, who struck
African-Americans to get the all-white jury that sentenced Horton to death,
routinely struck all black citizens from jury service.'
William Alvin Smith, a mentally retarded youth sentenced to death in
Georgia, was granted habeas corpus relief after a federal district court judge
heard evidence of Smith's mental retardation and concluded that, because
of his disability, Smith did not understand the Miranda rights read to him.3 1
Amadeo, Horton, and Smith were not innocent, but they were uncon-
stitutionally sentenced to death.37 Like many others granted federal habeas
corpus relief, they were not resentenced to death upon return to the state
courts. Tony Amadeo graduated swnna cum laude from Mercer University
in the summer of 1995.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, it
is doubtful whether evidentiary hearings would even be granted in these and
scores of other cases in which relief was granted under the previous law.
The constitutional violations will still exist, but under the new Act, federal
courts are prohibited from conducting evidentiary hearings and receiving
evidence of the violations.
Nor is it clear that relief would be granted in many of these cases
under the new standard of review that prohibits federal courts from setting
aside a state court's legal conclusions, unless the state court's decision was
"contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law." 3
8
In addition, many of those who languish in prison for years before
getting a lawyer, as did Rubin Carter, will be denied even a chance to
present their claims to a federal court because without a lawyer they will
be unable to comply with the one-year statute of limitations. The Supreme
34. Id. at 217.
35. Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1449, 1455-60 (11th Cir. 1991).
36. Smith v. Kemp, 664 F. Supp. 500, 505 (M.D. Ga. 1987), aff'd by equally divided
court, 887 F.2d 1407 (11th Cir. 1989).
37. Amadeo, Horton, and Smith are but a few of the many people unconstitutionally
sentenced to death who received habeas corpus relief from federal courts. Even with the
development of many procedural barriers to federal habeas corpus review, federal courts
found constitutional error in 40% of the first 361 capital judgments reviewed in habeas cor-
pus proceedings between the restoration of the death penalty in 1976 and mid-1991. James
S. Liebman, More than "Slightly Retro:" The Rehnquist Court's Rout of Habeas Corpus
Jurisdiction in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 537, 541 n.15 (1991).
38. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 104(3), 110 Stat. 1214, 1219 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West Supp. 1996)).
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Court has held that states are not required to provide counsel for the poor
for state post-conviction review,39 even in capital cases.' For hundreds of
those serving noncapital sentences and even for some under death sen-
tences, time will run out before they can get a lawyer who will prepare a
petition. The statute of limitations also creates the possibility of fatal con-
sequences to the client for a mistake by counsel. The person whose lawyer
misses the deadline created by the statute of limitations apparently will be
barred from ever seeking federal review.4 '
A statute of limitations for habeas corpus actions was previously pro-
posed by a committee chaired by retired Justice Lewis Powell and by the
American Bar Association (ABA), but both proposals linked the statute of
limitations to the provision of counsel at all stages of review; a state would
get the benefit of a statute of limitations only if it provided competent
counsel at all stages of the process.42 However, the one-year statute of
limitations contained in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 is not dependent upon the states providing counsel to those who
would be affected by the deadline.43 Before adopting the Act, Congress
made it even more difficult for those most in need of counsel - those
under death sentence - to obtain representation by eliminating funding for
death penalty resource centers.' Thus, poor people who may be wrong-
fully imprisoned or sentenced to death now face a new, complex set of
barriers to vindication of their constitutional rights, but do not even have
lawyers to help them understand the Act or comply with its provisions.
Even before passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, the Supreme Court had greatly restricted the availability of
39. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 614-18 (1974).
40. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989).
41. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (barring federal
habeas review of issues raised in state post-conviction proceedings because counsel failed
to file timely notice of appeal in state court).
42. JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S., AD Hoc COMMITrEE ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPus
IN CAPrrAL CAsEs: COMMITEE REPORT AND PRoPoSAL 4-6 (1989) (finding "pressing need
for qualified counsel to represent inmates in collateral review" and proposing six-month
statute of limitations to apply in states that provide counsel in collateral review); see also
Robbins, supra note 24, at 11, 16 (finding that "the inadequacy and inadequate compensation
of counsel at trial" are among "principal failings of the capital punishment review process
today" and recommending that states be required to provide counsel in state post-conviction
proceedings and adopt one-year statute of limitations).
43. An even shorter statute of limitations of six months is provided in capital cases for
states that provide counsel at all stages and that meet certain standards in doing so. Anti-
terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 107 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2263
(West Supp. 1996)).
44. Coyle, supra note 17.
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habeas corpus relief. The Court adopted and rigorously enforced strict
rules of procedural default,4' excluded Fourth Amendment claims from
habeas corpus review,' made it more difficult for a habeas petitioner to
obtain an evidentiary hearing to prove a constitutional violation,47 adopted
an extremely restrictive doctrine regarding the retroactivity of constitutional
decisions,' reduced the burden on the states to establish harmless error
once a constitutional violation was found,49 and erected barriers to the filing
of a second habeas petition.5
Justice Harry Blackmun found the majority of the Supreme Court to
be on a "crusade to erect petty procedural barriers in the path of any state
prisoner seeking review of his federal constitutional claims," which resulted
in a "Byzantine morass of arbitrary, unnecessary, and unjustifiable impedi-
ments to the vindication of federal rights."5' Justice John Paul Stevens
observed that "the Court has lost its way in a procedural maze of its own
creation" and "grossly misevaluated the requirements of 'law and jus-
tice.'"5 However, instead of pointing a way out of the maze, Congress
created even more barriers to appellate review that will produce even more
arbitrary and unjust results.
Those on the Court and elsewhere who have advocated limiting habeas
corpus review say restrictions are necessary to serve the interests of federal-
ism, comity, expense minimization, and finality. For example, in holding
45. The Court adopted the "cause" and "prejudice" standard in Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72, 88-91 (1977). In later decisions, the Court strictly applied the procedural
default rules to bar constitutional claims. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,
729-57 (1991); Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 406-11 (1989); Smith v. Murray, 477
U.S. 527, 533-36 (1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 130-34 (1982); Timothy J. Foley,
The New Arbitrariness: Procedural Default of Federal Habeas Claims in Capital Cases, 23
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 193, 195 (1989).
46. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482-95 (1976).
47. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 5-12 (1992).
48. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989). For a discussion of the Court's
retroactivity doctrines, see generally Liebman, supra note 37.
49. Brecht v. Abralamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993). In Brecht v. Abrahamson, the
Court held that habeas corpus relief is not to be granted unless the Court concludes that
the constitutional error had "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining
the jury's verdict." Id. (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
In contrast, on direct appeal, once a constitutional violation is established, relief must be
granted unless the government can establish that the error was "harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt." Id. at 630 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
50. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 477-503 (1991).
51. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 758-59 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
52. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 541 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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that Roger Keith Coleman's claims were barred because his lawyer was late
in filing his notice of appeal, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor opened the
majority opinion with the sentence, "This is a case about federalism."53
Justice Blackmun observed in dissent:
Federalism; comity; state sovereignty; preservation of state resources;
certainty: The majority methodically inventories these multifarious state
interests .... One searches the majority's opinion in vain, however,
for any mention of petitioner Coleman's right to a criminal proceeding
free from constitutional defect or his interest in finding a forum for his
constitutional challenge to his conviction and sentence of death.5'
Restrictions on federal habeas corpus review also rest on the confi-
dence that state court judges will enforce the Constitution as well as their
federal counterparts.55 It is important to assess whether this confidence is
misplaced because state court judges are clearly left with the primary
responsibility for enforcing the Constitution and ensuring fairness as a result
of the changes brought about by the Court and Congress.
The Lack of Independence of State Judges
State court judges in most states lack the independence and security of
federal judges who have tenure for life. 56 State court judges in all but a
handful of states must stand for electionY In criminal cases, enforcing the
law may cost them their jobs. An elected judge who upholds a constitu-
tional right of a person accused of child molestation, murder, or some other
crime may be signing his or her own political death warrant.
53. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991).
54. Id. at 758 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
55. See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 636 (1993) (rejecting argument
that less demanding harmless-error standard in federal habeas review will result in state
courts refusing to find error harmless, unless litigants showed "affirmative evidence that
state-court judges are ignoring their oath"); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 549 (1981)
(expressing view that deference to state court fact-finding is appropriate because "[s]tate
judges as well as federal judges swear allegiance to the Constitution of the United States,
and there is no reason to think that because of their frequent differences of opinions as to
how that document should be interpreted, all are not doing their m6rtal best to discharge
their oath of office"). But see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 525 (1976) (Brennan, I.,
dissenting) (asserting that "[s]tate judges popularly elected may have difficulty resisting
popular pressures not experienced by federal judges given lifetime tenure").
56. U.S. CONST. art Hm, § 1.
57. Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding
Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759,
777-79 nn.85-89 (1995) (noting that in forty-two states overall, and in thirty-two of thirty-
eight states that have death penalty, judges stand for election or retention).
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Justice Penny White was voted off the Tennessee Supreme Court after
a decision by that court in a death penalty case caused the Republican Party
and other groups to oppose her retention. Immediately after the retention
election, the Governor of Tennessee, Don Sundquist, said: "Should a judge
look over his shoulder [in making decisions] about whether they're going
to be thrown out of office? I hope so." 8 This view contrasts sharply with
a statement made by Justice Stevens at the ABA meeting in Orlando the
same month: "It was never contemplated that the individual who has to
protect our individual rights would have to consider what decision would
produce the most votes."59
Justice White's opponents succeeded 'in turning her retention election
into a referendum on the death penalty. The Tennessee Conservative Union
sent out a letter that opened with the following description of crimes com-
mitted by Richard Odom:
78-year-old Ethel Johnson lay dying in a pool of blood. Stabbed in the
heart, lungs, and liver, she fought back as best she could. Her hands
were sliced to ribbons as she tried to push the knife away. And then she
was raped. Savagely.
... But her murderer won't be getting the punishment he deserves.
Thanks to Penny WhiteA0
The Republican Party mailed a brochure to voters titled, "Just Say NO!"
with the slogan, "Vote for Capital Punishment by Voting NO on August 1
for Supreme Court Justice Penny White. ",61 Inside, the brochure described
three cases to demonstrate that Justice White "puts the rights of criminals
before the rights of victims. "62 It described the same case as follows:
Richard Odom was convicted of repeatedly raping and stabbing to death
a 78 year old Memphis woman. However, Penny White felt the crime
wasn't heinous enough for the death penalty - so she struck it down.A
Neither mailing disclosed that Odom's case was reversed because all five
members of the Tennessee Supreme Court agreed that there had been at
58. Paula Wade, White's Defeat Poses a Legal Dilemma: How Is a Replacement Jus-
tice Picked?, MEM. COM. APPEAL, Aug. 3, 1996, at Al.
59. Justice John Paul Stevens, Opening Assembly Address at the American Bar Associ-
ation Annual Meeting 12 (Aug. 3, 1996) (quoting Florida Supreme Court Justice Ben Overton).
60. Duren Cheek, Campaign Against White over Rape Case Unfair, Supporters Say,
NASHvILLE TENNEsSEAN, June 20, 1996, at 3B (quoting letter).
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least one legal error that required a new sentencing hearing.' Nor did they
mention that the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals also concluded that
Odom was entitled to a new sentencing hearing.' The Tennessee Supreme
Court affirmed Odom's conviction and remanded his case for a new sen-
tencing hearing.' No member of the court expressed the view that the
crime was not heinous enough to warrant the death penalty. Indeed, the
remand for a new sentencing hearing made it quite clear that the court did
not find the death penalty inappropriate for Odom. Justice White did not
write the majority opinion, a concurring opinion, or a dissenting opinion in
the case. Yet Tennessee voters were led to believe that she had personally
struck down Odom's death penalty because she did not think the crime was
"heinous enough."
Justice White's opponents also blamed her for the fact that Tennessee
has not carried out any executions in the last thirty-six years.67 But the
Odom case was the only capital case that came before the court during
White's nineteen months on the court.6" Justice White was opposed by
Tennessee's governor and both its United States Senators, all Republicans.69
64. See State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 32-33 (renn. 1996). In an opinion by Justice
Birch, three members of the court held that there were three errors requiring reversal. Id.
The remaining two members of the court concurred with regard to one error, but dissented
with regard to the other two. Id. at 33 (Anderson, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
65. See State v. Odom, No. 02C01-9305-CR-00080, 1994 WL 568433, at *6-*10, *24
(Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 19, 1994) (reversing and remanding for new sentencing hearing
because defendant was precluded from presenting mitigating evidence at penalty phase),
f'd, 928 S.W.2d 18 (Tenn. 1996).
66. State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 18.
67. See Jeff Woods, Sundquist Admits Early Ballot to Boot White, NASHVILLE
BANNER, July 26, 1996, at B2 (reporting that "White's foes are casting the election as a
referendum on the death penalty"). After the election, Governor Sundquist said White was
defeated because voters "believe it's wrong that we haven't enforced the death penalty in
36 years, despite the overwhelming need and support for it." Tom Humphrey, White Ouster
Signals New Political Era; Judges May Feel 'Chilling Effect,' KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL,
Aug. 4, 1996, at Al. Republican Party chair Jim Burnett said: "The public was fed up.
We've had a death penalty since 1976 and we haven't had an execution yet." John Gibeaut,
Taking AIM, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1996, at 50, 51; see also Editorial, Litmus Test vs. The Law,
NASHVILLE TENNESSEAN, Aug. 6, 1996, at 6A ("Without a doubt, many of the voters who
voted against White vere expressing their frustration with the fact that Tennessee has not
executed a death row inmate in 36 years.").
68. Gibeaut, supra note 67, at 50, 51 (describing defeat of Justice White and chal-
lenges to other judges).
69. Jeff Woods, Public Outrage Nails a Judge, NASHviLLE BANNER, Aug. 2, 1996,
at 1A (reporting that Governor Sundquist and Senators Fred Thompson and Bill Frist all
announced their opposition to White).
IS FAIRNESS IRRELEVANT?
Justice White is the most recent example of a state court judge re-
moved from office after campaigns that promised results - more death
sentences, not justice - and that relied on distortions of a judge's record
to make the judge appear "soft on crime. 7
In 1986, the Governor of California, George Deukmejian, publicly
warned two justices of the state's supreme court that he would oppose them
in their retention elections unless they voted to uphold more death sen-
tences.7' Obviously, he did not know the legal issues presented by those
cases; all he was interested in was results. Deukmejian had already an-
nounced his opposition to Chief Justice Rose Bird because of her votes in
capital cases.' Apparently unsatisfied with the subsequent votes of the
other two justices, the governor carried out his threat.' He opposed the
retention of all three justices, and all lost their seats after a campaign
dominated by the death penalty.' Deukmejian appointed their replacements
in 1987.
After a decision by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, reversing the
conviction in a particularly notorious capital case, a former chairman of the
state Republican Party called for Republicans to take over the court in the
1994 election.75 The voters responded to the call. Republicans won every
position they sought on the court that year.76 One candidate for the court,
Stephen W. Mansfield, campaigned on promises of greater use of the death
penalty, greater use of the harmless-error doctrine, and sanctions for
70. For a more detailed description of other such campaigns, see Bright & Keenan,
supra note 57, at 784-92; Gibeaut, supra note 67, at 50, 51.
71. Steve Wiegand, Governor's Warning to 2 Justices, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 14, 1986,
at 1.
72. Leo C. Wolinsky, Governor's Support for 2 Justices Tied to Death Penalty Votes,
L.A. Timms, Mar. 14, 1986, pt. 1, at 3.
73. Henry Unger, Wi!! Vote Against Grodin, Reynoso, Deukmejian Says, L.A. DAILY
J., Aug. 26, 1986, at 1.
74. Frank Clifford, Voteis Repudiate 3 of Court's Liberal Justices, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
5, 1986, pt. 1, at 1 (describing how Rose Bird's "box score" of sixty-one reversal votes in
sixty-one capital cases became "constant refrain of the campaign against her," and how
campaign commercials against other two justices in last month of race insisted "that all three
justices needed to lose if the death penalty is to be enforced"); see also Philip Hager, Grodin
Says He Was "Caught" in Deukmejian's Anti-Bird Tide, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 13, 1986, pt. 1,
at 3 (quoting defeated Justice Joseph R. Grodin saying that he was defeated in "tide of
opposition to the chief justice and frustration over the death penalty").
75. Janet Elliott & Richard Connelly, Mansfield: The Stealth Candidate; His Past Isn't
What It Seems, TEX. LAW., Oct. 3, 1994, at 1. The case was Rodriguez v. State, 848
S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993, no pet.).
76. John Williams, Election '94: GOP Gains Majority in State Supreme Court, -ous.
CHRON., Nov. 10, 1994, at A29.
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attorneys who file "frivolous appeals especially in death penalty cases. "I
Before the election, it came to light that Mansfield had misrepresented his
prior background, experience, and record;78 that he had been fined for
practicing law without a license in Florida;79 and that* - contrary to his
assertions that he had experience in criminal cases ind had "written exten-
sively on criminal and civil justice issues" - he had virtually no experience
in criminal law." Nevertheless, Mansfield received fifty-four percent of the
votes in the general election, defeating the incumbent judge, a conservative
former prosecutor who had served twelve years on the court and had been
supported by both sides of the criminal bar."' After his election, Texas
Lawyer declared Mansfield an "unqualified success. "I
Justice James Robertson was voted off the Mississippi Supreme Court
in 1992. His opponent in the Democratic primary ran as a "law and order
candidate" with the support of the Mississippi Prosecutors Association.'
77. Elliott & Connelly, supra note 75.
78. Before the election, Mansfield admitted to lying about his birthplace (he claimed
to be born in Texas, but was born in Massachusetts), the amount of time he had spent in
Texas, and his prior political experience. Id.; Janet Elliott, Unqualifed Success: Mansfield's
Mandate; Vote Makes a Case for Merit Selection, TEX. LAW., Nov. 14, 1994, at 1 (report-
ing that Mansfield was unable to verify campaign claims regarding number of criminal cases
he had handled and had portrayed himself as political novice despite having twice unsuccess-
fully run for Congress); see also Editorial, Do It Now, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM,
Nov. 12, 1994, at 32 (calling for reform of judicial selection system in Texas and for
immediate challenge to Mansfield's election because he had "shaded the truth of virtually
every aspect of his career"); Q & A with Stephen Mansfield; 'The Greatest Challenge of My
Lfe,' TEX. LAW., Nov. 21, 1994, at 8 (printing post-election interview with Mansfield in
which he "retracts" several statements made before and during interview). After the
election, it was discovered that Mansfield had failed to report $10,000 in past-due child
support when he applied for his Texas law license in 1992. Child Support Allegations
Threaten Judge Seat, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Dec. 10, 1994, at 29.
79. Williams, supra note 76.
80. Elliott & Connelly, supra note 75. Mansfield received the support of victims'
rights groups. 1d.
81. Elliott, supra note 78. Mansfield won 54% of the vote in the general election; his
opponent, Judge Charles F. Campbell, received 46%. Id. Mansfield had previously won
the Republican nomination for the seat, winning 67% of the primary vote in defeating John
Cossum, a former state and tederal prosecutor who was working as a criminal defense
lawyer in Houston. Elliott & Connelly, supra note 75.
82. Elliott, supra note 78.
83. David W. Case, In Search of an Independent Judiciary: Alternatives to Judicial
Elections in Mississippi, 13 MIss. C. L. REV. 1, 15-20 (1992). The resolution of the
Mississippi Prosecutors Association asserted that Robertson's opponent "best represents the
views of the law abiding citizens" and "will give the crime victims and the good, honest and
law abiding people of this state a hearing that is at least as fair as that of the criminal in
child abuse, death penalty, and other serious criminal cases." Id. at 16 n.108.
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Robertson was attacked for a concurring opinion he had written expressing
the view that the Constitution did not permit the death penalty for rape
when there was no loss of life.' However, Robertson and his fellow jus-
tices who had taken an oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States
had no choice. The United States Supreme Court had held ten years earlier
that the Eighth Amendment did not permit the death penalty in such cases."
Robertson's opponents also told Mississippi voters that Robertson
believed "a defendant who 'shot an unarmed pizza delivery boy in cold-
blood' had not committed a crime serious enough to warrant the death
penalty. " In truth, Justice Robertson filed a dissent in the case expressing
his view that because the trial court had failed to define the "heinous,
atrocious or cruel" aggravating factor for the jury, it should be remanded
for a new sentencing hearing.' He did not suggest that the crime was not
serious enough to warrant a death sentence on remand.
The eventual disposition of the case vindicated the position taken in
dissent by Justice Robertson. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari and remanded the case to the Mississippi Supreme Court because
it could not tell how the majority of the Mississippi court had resolved the
issue.8" On remand, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the case and
remanded it to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.89 Thus, had
Justice Robertson's view prevailed on the initial appeal, it would have saved
four years and considerable costs and reduced the time for the resentencing
in the case. If anything, Justice Robertson's dissent would appear to be an
indication of his abilities as a judge and not a basis for removing him from
the court.
Those who suggest that this is nothing more than democracy in action
misunderstand the role of courts in our society and the importance of inde-
84. Leatherwood v. State, 548 So. 2d 389, 403-06 (Miss. 1989) (Robertson, J.,
concurring) (expressing view that there was "as much chance of the Supreme Court sanc-
tioning death as a penalty for any non-fatal rape as the proverbial snowball enjoys in the
nether regions"). An editorial attacking the decision was reprinted in advertisements for
Robertson's opponent. Editorial, Court's Ruling Morally Repugnant, CLARION-LEDGER
(Jackson, Miss.), July 2, 1989, reprinted in Editorial, On March 10, Vote for Judge James
L. Roberts, Jr. for the Mississippi Supreme Court, N.E. Miss. DAILY J., Mar. 7, 1992
(Campaign Supp.), at 6.
85. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977).
86. Case, supra note 83, at 18.
87. Clemons v. State, 535 So. 2d 1354, 1367-68 (Miss. 1988) (Robertson, J., dis-
senting), rev'd sub nom. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990), remanded for
resentencing sub nom. Clemons v. State, 593 So. 2d 1004 (Miss. 1992).
88. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. at 750-52.
89. Clemons v. State, 593 So. 2d at 1007.
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pendent courts. As Judge William Cranch wrote, courts have a duty to
decide the legal issues before them "undisturbed by the clamor of the multi-
tude."9I Often that includes protecting the rights of various minorities -
political, racial, and ethnic. Unlike legislatures or executives, courts are
not expected to gauge public opinion by resort to focus groups or public
opinion polls before making their decisions. Judges are expected to enforce
the law, whether it be the First Amendment rights of the radical right or the
radical left to publish unpopular political views, the right of The New York
Times to publish the Pentagon Papers,9 or the right of a suspected child
molester to a fair and impartial trial. No one has said it better than Justice
Robert H. Jackson:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles
to be Applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property,
to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and
other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on
the outcome of no elections. 9
The threat that a judge can be removed from office because of an
unpopular decision undermines the independence, integrity, and impartiality
of the judiciary. A grievance similar to the one made against King
George III in the Declaration of Independence could be leveled against
those politicians who attack judges for their rulings: "He has made judges
dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices ......
The costs extend far beyond those who are removed from office. The
greatest threat to the rule of law comes from those judges who remain on
courts, but refuse to enforce the law in instances when an unpopular out-
come could jeopardize their careers. Once a judge compromises his or her
oath by refusing to enforce the law in order to stay in office or advance to
a higher court, both the judge and the court are irreparably diminished. In
addition, the credibility of courts suffers when judges are perceived as
giving in to political pressures.
The overall quality of justice is affected when courts are composed of
judges who seek to produce certain results. The California Supreme Court,
which had been one of the most distinguished state supreme courts in the
country, is now an undistinguished death mill known mostly for its various
90. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 303
(1923).
91. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
92. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
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refinements of the harmless-error doctrine. One scholar has observed that
the court's harmless-error decisions reflect a "desire to carry out the death
penalty" more than they reflect "jurisprudential theory. "I
The vulnerability of state court judges also discourages those individu-
als whom we would most want to be judges from seeking or taking the
bench. After what happened to Justice White in Tennessee or Justice Rob-
ertson in Mississippi, why would any conscientious lawyer want to accept
a seat on one of those courts, knowing that one opinion may be used to
misrepresent everything they may do as a judge? Do we want judges who
violate the Canons of Judicial Ethics9 before even taking office by promis-
ing certain results to the voters or an executive?
Most fundamentally, however, when judges must depend upon majority
approval, courts are unable to perform one of their most important constitu-
tional roles, described by Justice Hugo L. Black, of serving as "havens of
refuge for those who might otherwise suffer because they are helpless,
weak, outnumbered, or because they are .. .victims of prejudice and
public excitement."' Today, as politicians in both major political parties
compete to show who can be the toughest on those who are most defense-
less - poor people accused of crime, immigrants, and those on welfare -
there is a particularly urgent need for independent courts that can determine
whether politically expedient measures pass constitutional muster.
Denial of Effective Counsel
Equally essential to fairness as the right to an impartial and independ-
ent judge is the right to counsel. The skills of a lawyer are required to
enforce every legal right of the citizen who stands accused. Otherwise,
those fundamental protections, designed to ensure a fair trial and a reliable
result, mean nothing. Counsel is also essential for the presentation of
relevant evidence to the trier of fact. As the Supreme Court observed in
Gideon v. Wainwright:1
[IOn our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial
93. Elliot C. Kessler, Death and Harmlessness: Application of the Harmless Error Rule
by the Bird and Lucas Courts in Death Penalty Cases - A Comparison & .Critique, 26
U.S.F. L. REv. 41, 89 (1991).
94. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (1990) (prohibiting
judicial candidates from making "pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the
faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office").
95. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940).
96. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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unless counsel is provided for him.... [L]awyers in criminal courts
are necessities, not luxuries.'
Unfortunately, the promise of Gideon that competent counsel would be
provided for the poor has not been realized in many states. A stark exam-
ple is provided by an account of a capital trial in Houston, Texas:
Seated beside his client - a convicted capital murderer - defense
attorney John Benn spent much of Thursday afternoon's trial in appar-
ent deep sleep.
His mouth kept falling open and his head lolled back on his shoul-
ders, and then he awakened just long enough to catch himself and sit
upright. Then it happened again. And again. And again.
Every time he opened his eyes, a different prosecution witness was
on the stand describing another aspect of the Nov. 19, 1991, arrest of
George McFarland in the robbery-killing of grocer Kenneth Kwan.
When state District Judge Doug Shaver finally called a recess, Benn
was asked if he truly had fallen asleep during a capital murder trial.
"It's boring," the 72-year-old longtime Houston lawyer explained.98
This does not offend the Sixth Amendment, the trial judge explained,
because, "[t]he Constitution doesn't say the lawyer has to be awake."I The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals apparently agreed with this analysis. It
rejected McFarland's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,"° applying
the standard set by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington."°'
The majority opinion of the Texas court even suggested that it may
have been a "strategic move" for the attorney who assisted Benn to allow
Benn to sleep because it might cause the jury to have sympathy for Mc-
Farland. 1°2 Judge Baird, who dissented, found this suggestion to be "utterly
ridiculous. '"103 He pointed out that a "sleeping counsel is unprepared
to present evidence, to cross-examine witnesses, and to present any coordi-
nated effort to evaluate evidence and present a defense."" 4 He observed:
97. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
98. John Makeig, Asleep on the Job? Slaying Trial Boring, Lawyer Says, Hous.
CHRON., Aug. 14, 1992, at A35.
99. Id.
100. McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 499 ('rex. Crim. App. 1996, no pet.), cert.
denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 31 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1997) (No. 96-5891).
101. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
102. McFarland, 928 S.W.2d at 505 n.20.
103. Id. at 527 (Baird, J., dissenting).
104. Id. (Baird, J., dissenting).
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The trial judge had so little confidence in Benn's ability to represent
[McFarland] that [a second attorney] was appointed to assist Benn. But
Benn remained the lead attorney. And considering the lack of
communication between Benn and [the second attorney], the lack of
preparation for trial, and the uncontroverted evidence of Benn's sleep-
ing, I have no confidence in the hand that guided [McFarland's] repre-
sentation. ....
... Neither attorney interviewed a witness and neither attorney
reviewed the extraneous offenses that were to be later admitted. Benn
decided which witness he would cross-examine and he informed [co-
counsel] of his decision only after the State's examination. Thus, [co-
counsel's] preparation for cross-examination of his witnesses could not
have been effective because he did not know which witnesses he was to
question. And considering the role to which he was relegated, [co-
counsel] was in no position to put forward a coordinated defense strat-
egy. Even more disturbing, Benn could sleep during the direct exami-
nation and still elect to conduct cross-examination. It seems to me that
[co-counsel's] belief that the jury might feel sympathy for [McFarland]
was more a desperate hope than reasonable trial strategy.1 5
But George McFarland is not the only person whose lawyer slept
during a capital trial in Houston, the city responsible for more executions
than any other jurisdiction in the country. 6 Calvin Burdine and Carl John-
son both had the misfortune to have attorney Joe Frank Cannon assigned
to defend them. They are among ten clients of Cannon who have been
sentenced to death."° Cannon has been appointed by judges in Houston to
numerous criminal cases in the last forty-five years, despite his tendency to
doze off during trial."'
In Calvin Burdine's case, the trial court found that Cannon "dozed and
actually fell asleep" during trial, "in particular during the guilt-innocence
phase when the State's solo prosecutor[] was questioning witnesses and pre-
105. Id. at 527-28 (Baird, J., dissenting).
106. Since the reinstatement of capital punishment in 1976, more people have been
executed from Harris County, which includes Houston, than from any state in the union
except Texas. Barry Shlachter, State of Execution Texas Keeps No. 1 Ranking in Capital
Punishment Through Public Support, Aggressive Prosecution, FORT WORTH STAR-TELE-
GRAM, Feb. 12, 1995, available in 1995 WL 5622189 ("Death sentences from courts in
Houston's county, Harris, alone have accounted for more executions than the second-ranking
state, Florida.").
107. Paul M. Barrett, On the Defense: Lawyer's Fast Work on Death Cases Raises
Doubts About System, WALL ST. L, Sept. 7, 1994, at Al (reporting that Cannon is known
for hurrying through capital trials liki "greased lightening," allegedly falling asleep on
occasion, and having had ten clients sentenced to death).
108. Id.
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senting. evidence." 1" The clerk of the court testified that "defense counsel
was asleep on several occasions on several days over the course of the
proceedings."' Cannon's file on the case contained only three pages of
notes."' Once again, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that a
sleeping attorney was sufficient "counsel" under the Sixth Amendment.
12
After Carl Johnson had been sentenced to death at a trial in which he
was represented by Cannon, his post-conviction appeals were taken by
Professor David Dow of the University of Houston Law Center, a supporter
of the death penalty."' Upon review of the record in the case, Professor
Dow found that "the ineptitude of the lawyer . . . jumps off the printed
page,"
'14 and added that:
During long periods of jury voir dire, while the State was asking ques-
tions of individual jurors, the transcripts give one the impression that
Johnson's lawyer was not even present in the courtroom. Upon investi-
gation, it turned out that he was in fact present; it's just that he was
asleep. 1
15
Both the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held Johnson was not denied his Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel." 6 Neither court published its opinion." 7 Carl John-
son was executed on September 19, 1995.1
When one city - the capital of capital punishment - has three cases
in which death was imposed and upheld by the state's highest court even
though the defense lawyers were asleep during the trials, it speaks volumes
about the lack of commitment to fairness by courts. But equally shocking
examples are found throughout the country.
109. Exparte Burdine, 901 S.W.2d 456, 457 (Tex. Crim. App., no pet.) (Maloney, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2256 (1995).
110. Id. The clerk testified that counsel "fell asleep and was asleep for long periods
of time during the questioning of witnesses." Id. at 457 n.1.
111. Barrett, supra note 107.
112. Burdine, 901 S.W.2d at 456 (denying application for writ of habeas corpus based
on ineffectiveness of Cannon).
113. David R. Dow, The State, the Death Penalty, and Carl Johnson, 37 B.C. L. REV.
691, 691 (1996).
114. Id. at 694.
115. Id. at 694-95.
116. Id. at 701, 706 n.44.
117. Id.
118. DEATH Row, U.S.A., supra note 10, at 8.
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A study of homicide cases in Philadelphia, which rivals Houston for
its high number of death cases," 9 found that the quality of lawyers ap-
pointed to capital cases in Philadelphia is so bad that "even officials in
charge of the system say they wouldn't want to be represented in Traffic
Court by some of the people appointed to defend poor people accused of
murder."" The study found that many of the attorneys were appointed by
judges based on political connections, not legal ability. "Philadelphia's
poor defendants often find themselves being represented by ward leaders,
ward committeemen, failed politicians, the sons of judges and party leaders,
and contributors to the judges' election campaigns."'2
Other studies have found the same poor quality of representation in
capital cases in one state after another. The National Law Journal, after an
extensive study of capital cases in six southern states, which account for the
vast majority of executions, found that capital trials are "more like a
random flip of a coin than a delicate balancing of the scales" because the
defense lawyer is too often "ill trained, unprepared . .. [and] grossly
underpaid. "
The ABA concluded after an exhaustive study that "the inadequacy and
inadequate compensation of counsel at trial" was one of the "principal
failings" of the capital punishment systems in states today." The ABA's
report illustrates the pervasiveness of the problem:
Georgia's recent experience with capital punishment has been marred
by examples of inadequate representation ranging from virtually no repre-
sentation at all by counsel, to representation by inexperienced counsel,
to failures to investigate basic threshold questions, to lack of knowledge
of governing law, to lack of advocacy on the issue of guilt, to failure to
present a case for life at the penalty phase....
... Defense representation is not necessarily better in other death
penalty states. In Tennessee, for another example, defense lawyers
offered no evidence in mitigation in approximately one-quarter of all
119. See Tina Rosenberg, The Deadliest D.A., N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1995, § 6
(Magazine), at 21 (noting that Philadelphia County's death row population of 105 is third
largest of any county in nation, close behind Houston's Harris County and Los Angeles
County).
120. Frederic N. Tulsky, Big-Time Trials, Small Time Defenses, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Sept. 14, 1992, at Al.
121. Id.
122. Marcia Coyle et al., Fatal Defense: Trial and Error in the Nation's Death Belt,
NAT'L U., June 11, 1990, at 30. Twelve articles examining the quality of representation
in numerous cases in the six states appear in The National Law Journal. Id. at 30-44.
123. Robbins, supra note 24, at 16.
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death sentences affirmed by the Tennessee Supreme Court since the Ten-
nessee legislature promulgated its current death penalty statute.17
Numerous articles and studies make clear the pervasiveness of the problem
in all types of criminal cases and the reasons for it: the grossly inadequate
funding of indigent defense systems, the lack of public defender programs
in many jurisdictions, the lack of independence of defender systems, and
the low standard for effective assistance established by the Supreme Court
in Strickland v. Washington."
The quality of legal representation one receives makes a difference.
Judge Alvin Rubin of the Fifth Circuit put it bluntly:
The Constitution, as interpreted by the courts, does not require that
the accused, even in a capital case, be represented by able or effective
counsel .... Consequently, accused persons who are represented by
"not-legally-ineffective" lawyers may be condemned to die when the
same accused, if represented by effective counsel, would receive at least
the clemency of a life sentence. "
Great outrage has been expressed by many because O.J. Simpson
received exceptional legal representation at his trial due to his wealth. But
little outrage is expressed about the far more common occurrence in the
criminal courts of this land - the wholly substandard representation that the
poor receive because of their poverty. But as bad as the counsel provided
to .poor people is at their trials, most are in an even worse predicament in
post-conviction review, when there is no obligation for states to provide
counsel at all. One who has been denied the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel at trial usually has no recourse. Most poor people cannot, without
124. Id. at 65-67.
125. 466 U.S. 668 (1984); see ABA Juv. JUST. PROJECT ET AL., A CALL FOR JUSTICE:
AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELIN-
QUENCY PROCEEDINGS (Dec. 1995) (describing poor quality of representation for children
accused in delinquency proceedings); SPANGENBERG GROUP, A STUDY OF REPRESENTATION
IN CAPITAL CASES IN TExAS 156, 157 (1993) (prepared for State Bar of Texas). See
generally Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime butfor the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.. 1835 (1994); William S. Geimer, A Decade
of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91 (1995); Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of
"Counsel" in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IowA L. REv. 433 (1993); Richard Klein, The
Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be Compelled to Render the Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel, 68 INO. L.J. 363 (1993); Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes:
The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625 (1986); Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded
Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329 (1995).
126. Riles v. McCotter, 799 F.2d 947, 955 (5th Cir. 1986) (Rubin, J., concurring).
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counsel, even begin to establish in post-conviction review a claim of inef-
fective assistance of trial counsel.
Fairness Matters
Fairness is important to achieving just results that command the respect
of the community. The lack of fairness in the state court systems seriously
undermines the reliability of the results reached in many cases in those
courts. Moreover, although the result may be what the public wants in a
particular case, ultimately citizens will have little respect for courts that
bend with the political winds. No one can be expected to trust or respect
judgments obtained at trials in which the accused lacked adequate represen-
tation.
Justice Stevens recently observed that the "recent development of
reliable scientific evidentiary methods has made it possible to establish
conclusively that a disturbing number of persons who had been sentenced
to death were actually innocent.""z This "most dramatically illustrate[s]"
the consequences of failure to provide competent legal counsel to the poor,
according to Justice Stevens.'2 In the twenty years since the Supreme
Court upheld the resumption of capital punishment, fifty-nine persons sen-
tenced to death have been freed after establishing their innocence. 129 The
Department of Justice has recently published a report on a number of other
persons convicted of crimes, but later exonerated by scientific evidence. 130
Such clear cases of innocence raise questions about whether other cases
that cannot be conclusively resolved by scientific evidence may also involve
miscarriages of justice. For example, Lloyd Schiup, who had been sen-
tenced to death in Missouri, was recently granted federal habeas corpus
relief by a federal court due to evidence of his innocence."' The Supreme
Court had held that he was entitled to the hearing at which this evidence
was presented.3 2 It is doubtful whether he would obtain a hearing under
127. Stevens, supra note 59, at 13.
128. Id. at 12.
129. Ted Gest, A House Without a Blueprint, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., July 8, 1996,
at 41. For a description of foui hundred cases involving innocent people convicted of
capital crimes in the history of the United States, see MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE
OF INNOCENCE (1992).
130. NATIONAL INST. OF JUST., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE:
CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL
(1996).
131. Schlup v. Bowersox, No. 4:92CV443-JCH (D. Mo. May 2, 1996).
132. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
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the amendments contained in the Antiterrorism Act. Virginia nearly carried
out an execution of a person convicted in a very similar case despite ques-
tions of innocence.133
Questions of the adequacy of the legal process are also raised by
several cases of innocent people sentenced to death who were not released
by courts until after the media publicized their innocence. For example,
Alabama courts ordered the release of Walter McMillian, who spent six
years on Alabama's death row for a crime he did not commit, only after the
CBS news program 60 Minutes reported on his innocence."M Similarly, it
was only after 60 Minutes publicized the innocence of Clarence Lee Brand-
ley that the Texas courts, which had twice previously denied relief, ordered
a hearing that eventually led to his release. 5 Randall Dale Adams, whose
story'36 was told in the motion picture The Thin Blue Line, was released
from death row only because filmmakers demonstrated his innocence.
Fairness also matters because courts make many other decisions in
criminal cases besides guilt or innocence. A finding of guilt only raises a
second question of how that offender is to be punished. Punishments range
from community service, to fines, to ten days in jail, to ten years in prison,
to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, to death.
A fair process is essential to ensuring that such decisions are as well
informed as humanly possible. Before the execution of Horace Dunkins by
Alabama in 1989, when newspapers reported that Dunkins was mentally
retarded, at least one citizen who sat on Dunkins's case as a juror came
forward and said she would not have voted for the death sentence if she had
known of his mental limitations. 37 Because of the poor legal representation
that Dunkins had received from his court-appointed lawyer, evidence of his
mental retardation was not presented to the jury. The jury was unable to
133. See Laura LaFay, Condemned Man Protests Murder Conviction, VIRGINIAN-PILOT
& LEDGER STAR, Sept. 27, 1996, at B7; Stuart Taylor, Innocent? Execute Anyway, LEGAL
TIMES, Sept. 10, 1996, at 29. Governor George F. Allen commuted the death sentence of
Joseph Patrick Payne just three hours before Payne's scheduled execution. Laura LaFay,
Allen Commutes Death Sentence: Reprieve Comes 3 Hours Before Joseph Payne's Scheduled
Death, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER STAR, Nov. 8, 1995, at.A1. Payne will now serve a
life term without the possibility of parole. Id.
134. PETE EARLEY, CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE: DEATH, LIFE AND JUSTICE IN A
Sou'rHERN TowN 335-41, 346-47, 389-91 (1995) (describing 60 Minutes report and eventual
release of McMillian).
135. NICK DAVIES, WHITE LIES: RAPE, MURDER, AND JUSTICE TEXAS STYLE 307-09
(1991).
136. See RANDALL DALE ADAMS ET AL., ADAMS V. TEXAs 242-64, 280-333 (1991).
137. Peter Applebome, 2 Electric Jolts in Alabama Execution, N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
1989, at A6.
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perform its constitutional obligation to impose a sentence based on "a
reasoned moral response to the defendant's background, character and
crime,"'38 because it was not informed by defense counsel of Dunkins's
disability. Nevertheless, Dunkins was executed.
Fairness also matters because of the professed commitment of courts
to keep improper influences, such as racial prejudice,'39 from influencing
the outcome of cases. Racial disparities are found throughout the criminal
justice system."4 Virtually every report that has examined the operation of
the death penalty has found racial discrimination in its infliction.'41 One of
the most recent reports reaching this conclusion was issued in June of 1996
by the International Commission of Jurists, a highly regarded organization
made up of jurists around the world, after a visit to the United States. 42
Yet courts tolerate racial discrimination and often refuse even to
examine issues of racial prejudice. The Supreme Court allowed Georgia
138. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (quoting California v. Brown, 479
U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
139. See, e.g., Holland v. llinois, 493 U.S. 474, 488 (1990) (reiterating "earnestness"
of Court's "commitment to racial justice" while holding that prosecutorial use of peremptory
strikes against African-Americans did not violate Sixth Amendment right to impartial jury);
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309, 333 (1987) (describing "unceasing efforts" to
eliminate racial influences while finding that racial disparities in capital sentencing do not
violate Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments).
140. See, e.g., Stephens v. State, 456 S.E.2d 560, 561 (Ga.) (noting that out of 375
persons serving life sentences in Georgia for second conviction for sale or possession with
intent to distribute certain narcotics, 98.4% are African-Americans), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 144 (1995); State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 887 (Minn. 1991) (finding equal
protection violation due to more severe sentences imposed for possession of crack cocaine
than for powdered cocaine when 96.6% of those charged with possession of crack cocaine
are black and 79.6% of those charged with possession of powdered cocaine are white). See
generally Gary Kleck, Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing: A Critical Evaluation
of the Evidence with Additional Evidence on the Death Penalty, 46 AM. Soc. REV. 783
(1981); Samuel L. Myers, Jr., Racial Disparities in Sentencing: Can Sentencing Reforms
Reduce Discrimination in Punishment?, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 781 (1993); Dennis Cauchon,
Sentences for Crack Called Racist, USA TODAY, May 26, 1993, at IA; Ruth Marcus, Racial
Bias Widely Seen in Criminal Justice System, WASH. POST, May 12, 1992, at A4.
141. See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL Accr. OFF., REP. No. GGD-90-57 DEATH PENALTY
SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATITERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES (1990) (reporting that
synthesis of twenty-eight studies shows pattern of racial disparities in charging, sentencing,
and imposing death penalty under statutes adopted since 1972). See generally Stephen B.
Bright, Discrimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial Discrimination in
Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433 (1995) (describing racial
discrimination in infliction of death penalty and failure of courts to deal with it).
142. See generally INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH
PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES (June 1996).
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to carry out death sentences despite significant racial disparities in the
infliction of the death penalty.143 Two African-American men sentenced to
death by an all-white jury in Utah were executed even though jurors re-
ceived a note that contained the words "Hang the Nigger's" [sic] and a
drawing of a figure hanging on a gallows. 1" No court, state or federal,
even had a hearing on such questions as who wrote the note, what influence
it had on the jurors, and how widely it was discussed by the jurors.
William Henry Hance was executed in Georgia without any court holding
a hearing on the use of racial slurs by jurors who decided his fate.145 Other
courts have refused to look behind gross racial disparities for discrimina-
tion.146 The tolerance of racial discrimination and the refusal of courts even
to deal with these issues reveals a lack of commitment to fairness.
Fairness is crucial if citizens are to see the decisions of courts as
legitimate and entitled to respect. Of course, fairness should be assured at
the outset. Judges should be insulated from political pressures. Public
defender programs should be established and funded to provide competent
legal assistance to poor people accused of crimes. All parts of the commu-
nity should participate in the judicial process and other safeguards should
be taken to ensure that racial prejudice does not come into play. 47 But, as
we have seen, in many jurisdictions these safeguards are not present.
Moreover, criminal cases are often affected by the passions of the
moment. As Justice Stevens observed, "the emotional impact of [capital]
143. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 287-91 (1987) (allowing Georgia to carry out
executions even though death penalty is four times more likely to be administered in cases
in which victim was white than in cases involving black victims).
144. See Andrews v. Shulsen, 485 U.S. 919, 920 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
145. See Hance v. Zant, 511 U.S. 1013, 1014 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari); Bob Herbert, Jury Room Injustice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1994,
at A15; Bob Herbert, Mr. Hance's 'Perfect Punishment,'N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1994, at
D17.
146. See, e.g., Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d 455, 463-64 (Fla. 1992) (no hearing re-
quired on racial discrimination in infliction of death penalty in Florida); Stephens v. State,
456 S.E.2d 560, 561 (Ga.) (holding prima facie case of discrimination was not established
even though 98.4% of those serving life sentence for second drug offense were African-
American), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 144 (1995); Jones v. State, 440 S.E.2d 161, 163 (Ga.)
(no hearing required with regard to racial discrimination in capital sentencing in one Georgia
county), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 154 (1994). See generally Bright, supra note 141, at 467-
80 (describing tolerance of racial discrimination by courts and refusal of courts to. hold
hearings on issues of racial discrimination).
147. See, e.g., Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1986) (requiring questioning
about racial attitudes in capital cases involving interracial killing). Turner applies only to
capital cases involving interracial crimes.
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cases gives rise to a special risk of error."I's The failure of some states to
provide lawyers during post-conviction review and legislation narrowing
post-conviction review suggests that it is more important to hide constitu-
tional error than to expose and correct it. The failure to correct errors
found in post-trial review sends the message that constitutional violations
are inconsequential. It tells judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement offi-
cials that departures from constitutional standards in the quest for convic-
tions and death sentences will be tolerated. The short shrift that the Su-
preme Court, Congress, and the President have given habeas corpus reaf-
firms the notion voiced so often by politicians: that the Bill of Rights is
nothing more than a collection of "technicalities" that get in the way of
convicting the accused and carrying out their sentences. The underlying
assumption, of course, is that because those accused are guilty, the denial
of process does not matter.
The provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 restricting the power of federal courts to correct constitutional error
in criminal cases represent a decision that results are more important than
process, that finality is more important than fairness, and that proceeding
with executions is more important than determining whether convictions and
sentences were obtained fairly and reliably.
Such a system produces results - convictions and death sentences -
but it does not produce justice. All of us should be concerned about that.
In Robert Bolt's play, A Man for All Seasons, a young man argues that laws
that are inconvenient or unpopular should not be followed; indeed, he
would "cut down every law in England [to pursue the Devil]. "149 Thomas
More responds: "And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned
round on you - where would you hide ... the laws all being flat? This
country's planted thick with laws... [do you] really think you could stand
upright in the winds that would blow then?""s
The Need for Leadership
To achieve fairness in our courts we need leadership. Unfortunately,
we are not receiving that leadership from our political leaders or our bar
leaders. That was not always the case. When Robert F. Kennedy was the
Attorney General of the United States he championed the passage of the
Criminal Justice Act,' which established public defender programs for
148. Stevens, supra note 59, at 13.
149. ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 66 (1990).
150. Id.
151. Criminal Justice Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-455, 78 Stat. 552 (codified as
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federal courts. When Florida was asserting that poor people were not
entitled to counsel in criminal cases in the case of Gideon v. Wainwright"s
and asked other states to file amicus curiae briefs supporting its position,
Attorney General Walter Mondale of Minnesota, along with attorneys
general of twenty-one other states, filed as amici on Gideon's side, support-
ing the right to counsel.'
Today, we do not have this kind of leadership. Even the most minimal
efforts to improve the quality of representation for the poor are opposed by
the associations of state attorneys general and district attorneys. Indeed,
last year state attorneys general were successful in persuading Congress to
remove all federal funding for the small programs that provided representa-
tion to individuals sentenced to death." Not a word of protest was heard
from the Attorney General of the United States or the White House.
When federal Judge Harold Baer suppressed cocaine and heroin seized
by New York City police officers, 5 Republican presidential candidate
Robert Dole called for his impeachment,' 56 and the Clinton White House
suggested it would ask for his resignation if Judge Baer did not reverse his
ruling."s No leader in either party stepped forward to call Senator Dole or
President Clinton to task for the irresponsible statements, to defend judicial
independence, and to point out that judges are not to be removed from
office because one disagrees with their position.
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1994)).
152. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
153. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 335-36 (1963) (listing twenty-two states and
commonwealths supporting indigent defendant's right to counsel in criminal trial and joining
in brief as amici curiae). The only two states that supported Florida were North Carolina
and Alabama. Id. (listing Alabama and North Carolina as amici curiae in support of
Florida's position).
154. Coyle, supra note 17.
155. United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232, 243, vacated on reh'g, 921 F. Supp.
211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
156. Don Van Natta, Jr., Judges Defend a Colleague from Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
29, 1996, at B1 (reporting that "[o]n the Presidential campaign trail in California on Satur-
day, Senator Dole called for Judge Baer's impeachment").
157. Alison Mitchell, Clinton Pressing Judge to Relent, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1996,
at Al ("The White House put a Federal judge on public notice today that if he did not
reverse a widely criticized decision throwing out drug evidence, the President might ask for
his resignation.") After criticism by bar leaders, the White House backed off its threat of
asking for Judge Baer's resignation, issuing a statement that "the proper way for the
executive branch to contest judicial decisions with which it disagrees is to challenge them
in the courts." Linda Greenhouse, Judges As Political Issues; Clinton Move in New York
Case Imperils Judicial Independence, Bar Leaders Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1996 at A4.
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When Justice Penny White was being attacked by the Republican
governor of Tennessee and the chair of the Republican Party in that state,
responsible members of the party should have stepped forward, pointed out
the distortions, and reminded Tennessee voters of the importance of an
independent judiciary.
Those of you who have or will graduate from this law school will have
the opportunity to provide the leadership that is missing in this nation
today. You will be governors, legislators, judges, and community leaders.
If nothing else, you can refrain from the demagoguery on crime that so
dominates the political discourse in the United States today. You can
refrain from demeaning the Bill of Rights by referring to it as nothing more
than a collection of technicalities. You can refrain from taking cheap shots
at judges who abide by their oaths and uphold the Constitution even when
their decisions are not popular.
But you can do much more. You can help educate your fellow citizens
about the importance of process, the great value of the Bill of Rights. You
can help build indigent defense programs that are independent of judges and
prosecutors and that will provide the zealous and effective representation
that is essential to the proper working of the adversary system. You can
help your fellow citizens understand that when the lawyers at those pro-
grams do their jobs they are not defending crime, they are defending the
Constitution for all of us. You can help lead us away from the notion that
to avoid being soft on crime, one must be hard on the Bill of Rights.
You can raise questions about what kind of society you want for the
future. The new Constitutional Court of South Africa recently confronted
such a question in deciding the constitutionality of the death penalty for that
nation. Finding that South Africa's enlightenment includes a changing
outlook, from "vengeance to an appreciation of the need for understand-
ing, '158 the court concluded that the death penalty is cruel, unusual, and
degrading under that country's new constitution. 159
You can also respond individually by providing your services to those
who most desperately need them. They will not be the same people who
can pay you the most money. You must decide whether you will use your
enormous talents and the outstanding legal education you have obtained here
to become wealthy or to serve those most in need. Unfortunately, it is not
possible to do both. But remember, it is no sacrifice to receive the same
income as that received by teachers, farmers, workers on the assembly line,
158. State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), reprinted in 16 HUM. RTS. L.J.
154, 190 (1995) (Langa, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 177.
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police officers, and other good, decent working men and women who raise
families and contribute to their communities. To the contrary, it is a great
privilege to devote one's life to things that are important and about which
you care passionately.
Regardless of what the national government or your state legislature
may decide about its commitment to fairness, you can show your commit-
ment by representing poor people who otherwise would not have a zealous
advocate. You can practice law in communities all over this country where
there has never been a lawyer who would question the status quo, who
would give African-Americans the same representation as white people,
who would give the poor the same representation" as the rich. If you are
willing to live modestly and work hard, you can change that.
You have the opportunity to become what Martin Luther King, Jr., in
one of his many great sermons, called "drum majors for justice." Dr. King
described the drum major for justice as one who speaks the truth - no
matter how unwelcome it may be and no matter how uncomfortable it may
make the listener - and as one who gives his or her life to serving others:
to feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, and - particularly important for
lawyers - to visiting those who are in prison, and to loving and serving
humanity. 16° I encourage you to adopt his goal as a drum major for justice:
"I just want to be there in love and justice and in truth and in commitment
to others, so that we can make of this old world a new world." '
160. A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
259-67 (James M. Washington ed., 1986).
161. Id. at 267.
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